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WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM COMPARING MEDIATION
ACROSS LEVELS
Tom W. Milburn

The worlds of international and interpersonal mediation rarely intersect. Practitioners do not
interact with one another; scholarly commentaries on mediation in one sector seldom cite
material from the other sector. This tendency to treat each sector as an independent preserve
diminishes the potential to develop new insights for mediation theory and practice. Many
insights might come from "thinking outside the box" of assumptions imposed by conventional
practice.
To what extent are the international mediation processes and interpersonal mediation processes
similar or dissimilar? What can scholars learn from comparing them? Can mediators of
international conflicts learn from examining the mediation of interpersonal disputes, and can
mediators of interpersonal disputes profit from learning about mediation in international
contexts? How do we approach the comparison?
In the following pages we shall attempt to suggest the potential of such comparisons by focusing
on several fairly conventional dimensions. For each dimension we ask what the implications of
the differences and similarities are. We will focus on the characteristics of disputants, the nature
of effective mediators, aspects of the process, some of the subtleties of mediation and the success
of using these in enforcing settlements.

Social Context of Disputing
Mediation in some form has served as the central method of conflict management in small-scale
societies the world-over (Merry, 1982, 1989). It appears to have primacy in societies where
hierarchical and differentiated government and legal systems do not exist. Equally important,
interdependent community members locked together in continuing relationships find mediation
useful in reducing the costs of conflict to the community. Increasingly, members of the global
community as well as local communities have perceived themselves as interdependent and thus
likely to be influenced by what happens within their venues. A collection of ways to aid in the
resolution of disputes can prove useful to any level of community.

The Disputants
Disputants are sometimes divided into complainants and respondent, the initiators of and
responders to conflictual action, but disputant is the generic term. Disputants may negotiate with
one another or their representatives may do so for them. Both disputing and mediation take
different forms and have different meanings depending on whether or not principals or
representatives are involved. The roles of principals and representatives are further complicated
by whether the disputants are individuals or groups or states. When individuals engage

inmediation they often represent themselves, but on occasion they have lawyers or other
advocates appear with or instead of them. Nation states and groups, unless they are very small,
must be represented in mediation by individuals in positions of authority. There are times when
group leaders such as Chief Executive -Officers (CEOs) or dictators may have such authority in
their groups that they embody the group in their person. Representatives play important roles in
international mediation, but they may account for little in interpersonal mediation except in those
cases where attorneys represent parties.
From the standpoint of mediation, the two questions regarding the role of representatives are
whether a representative has binding authority to make agreements and whether a representative
is able to "sell" the agreement to the group or individuals he or she represents. Principals can
make binding decisions and need not make explicit the rationales for their agreements. When
rationales are not articulated, the logic of internal justification can be loose and inconsistent in a
way that articulated rationales cannot be. On the other hand, the need either to sell or justify an
agreement to a larger audience creates a special burden for mediation. That need is compounded
if a group must formally approve any agreement.
A gap can grow between the experience and perspectives of representatives in mediation and of
their constituents or constituencies. Since the constituents seldom have direct contact with the
"other side" or with the shifting definitions and understandings that emerge through the
mediation process, how can constituents possibly "keep up"? In interpersonal mediation with
individuals the solution is relatively easy and complete: the represented party can attend and
participate in the mediation process itself. In international mediation this solution obviously is
impossible. Other routes are taken to apprise nonparticipants of progress. But the more important
the approval of those outsiders, the more thorough these updates must be.
The potential for gaps to grow between representatives and their constituencies raises interesting
questions about the privacy or secrecy of mediation sessions. In order to keep constituencies up
to date, much of the content of mediation discussions, especially the step-bystep or staged
agreements, should be made public. In fact, the organization of steps for release of information to
constituencies may be among the most important parts of the mediation process. When
individuals are directly involved or when representatives embody the organization, such
concerns, of course, do not arise.
The existence of an agent who represents a principal often means that each party follows a
scenario and thus has much less discretion in arriving at an agreement than does a principal. The
relationship between principals and agents tends to be similar in mediations between states and
in mediation between individuals. However, in international mediation, there usually are several
levels of representatives and others who instruct the representatives. In a dispute between
individuals where an attorney represents each principal, that attorney typically must check back
with the client before any final agreement can be made. Similarly, representatives of
governments must check frequently with their political superiors, often after every negotiating
session.
Summit meetings between world leaders have principals as leading actors in negotiating
processes. Thus these meetings do not follow standard procedure in negotiating international

agreements, where governmental representatives must negotiate with other agencies within their
own governments as well as with one another. In the 1977 Camp David mediation arranged by
President Jimmy Carter, Carter mediated a complex set of disputes between Israel's Menachem
Begin and Egypt's Anwar Sadat. Begin and Sadat served as principals in the negotiation,
although their staffs were sometimes present as well and some staff members occasionally acted
as their representatives.
Concerns of face, honor, and status may be particularly important to each party in a dispute
between states, thus increasing the rigidity of their positions and their consequent intransigence
in moving toward agreements. States may look and plan farther in the future than do individuals.
Certainly the stakes at issue may be particularly weighty in conflicts between states and often the
issues far more complex.

Power Asymmetry
In both interpersonal and international mediation there can be an imbalance of power between
disputants which creates special problems for mediators (Milbum & Klimoski, 1996). There
were, for example, asymmetries in the Israel-Egypt mediations. Israel was militarily,
economically, and politically more powerful than Egypt, yet Sadat's position was a more
powerful one within the goverm-nent of Egypt than was Begin's within the Israeli government.
Begin frequently observed that he had to get his agreements supported by his cabinet and by the
Israeli Knesset, a democratic process which arrived at crucial decisions slowly. Of course, once
given his government's support, Begin's position was very strong indeed. Sadat's power
permitted him to make decisions on his own, but Arab opposition to his actions led to his
assassination (Carter, 1982; Bercovitch, 1986; Telhami, 1990).
This mediation suggests the complexity of the mix among the variables of concern here.
International disputes between heads of state with final decision-making authority may resemble
more closely interpersonal mediation. Personal rapport or antipathy, ego, and perceptions of
slight or insult may play a much larger role in relation to the substantive issues than they do
when representatives are involved. It is often the case that mediators feel some need to decrease
the power differences between disputants so that neither is in a position to overwhelm the other.
Power asymmetry is usually greater in international mediation; so the international mediator has
a larger role in balancing power and acting to decrease power asymmetry than does the
interpersonal mediator. International mediation is thus more like labor management mediation
where the mediators accept power imbalances as part of the reality with which they must deal. In
contrast, the mediator for interpersonal disputes tries to increase the perceived fairness of the
process.

The Mediator
There are generic aspects to the mediation process and mediator characteristics that tend to
remain similar across societal levels and sectors. To function well as a mediator, that person
ought to have some sense of similarities and differences in issues and in necessary skills and

procedures. The mediator must learn what the disputants consider the central factors of their
dispute. This means the mediator must grasp how the dispute got started and the direction it is
moving. The mediator must actively listen to each disputant, one at a time, and then attempt to
elicit one or more significant factors of cognitive and affective interest to both disputants. Such
must be done before the mediator can begin to help disputants explore ways to resolve and,
perhaps, to settle the dispute. In the process a new contract is created in which the next steps are
articulated clearly and agreed upon by all.
At least three characteristics of mediators can contribute to their effectiveness: the status of the
mediator vis-a-vis disputing parties; the mediator's neutrality; and the power of the mediator visa-vis the parties. Central to most discussions of interpersonal mediation is the contention that the
mediator should be a "neutral outsider." Yet in international disputes such a view does not accord
with the common use of highly interested parties as mediators. Often representatives of powerful
forces serve as mediators. For example, in the Camp David meetings, President Carter
functioned as a powerful, high status, active mediator with his own agenda. It was and still is to
America's advantage and to the advantage of U.S. presidents to increase the prospects for peace
in the Middle East in order to protect our alliance with Israel and our sources of Arab oil. Under
such circumstances it would be difficult for a president to remain altogether neutral. In spite of
what could be seen as lack of neutrality, however, President Carter managed to be effective.
Many small scale societies use knowledgeable and interested, but not necessarily neutral,
community elders as mediators (Merry, 1982, 1989).
The status of the mediator appears important for several reasons. The status of the mediator
promotes the confidence of the parties and their willingness to participate, it gives the mediator
leverage, and it permits the mediator to assert control over the process. Although mediators often
insist that they have no authority to impose agreements on parties, their authority must be
sufficient to direct and monitor the process. The mediator may remind the disputants that they
have agreed to procedural rules, may set deadlines, and may demand that parties work long
hours. To have this authority, the mediator must have sufficient status in relation to the parties.
Status typically derives from community or public standing; from the auspices of sponsorship (a
court, a recognized private agency, or a powerful nation); from an elevated position within a
societal or governmental hierarchy; from appropriate training in mediation or a related course of
study; or from experience in successfully mediating disputes. However, status is always relative,
and it must be evaluated in relation to the status of the parties to the dispute. For example, law
students may have sufficient status to mediate small claims cases sponsored by a local court, but
national leaders may require another national leader or a prestigious representative of a powerful
body to mediate a dispute between them. Thus, international mediators appear generally to be
prominent officials or national leaders, such as Secretaries of State or Presidents, or
representatives of the United Nations or the Vatican (Princen, 1987).
A prestigious mediator is particularly important when parties enter into mediation. At that point
disputants consider it a reward for a prestigious mediator to aid in the resolution of their dispute.
Since the prestige of the mediator can be indicated by past success as a mediator of serious
conflicts, the use of a prestigious, successful mediator can often move mediation along rapidly.
The use of respected community leaders as mediators, as occurs in small scale societies, is

generally discouraged in the United States where mediation is considered a specialized,
professional skill. The availability of a mediator with a particular reputation for fairness and
neutrality, who can be expected to treat each party. with equal respect, can encourage parties to
consider the process of mediation who would not have done so otherwise. The presence of a fair
mediator can be expected to increase satisfaction of disputants with the outcome of the
mediation. Such satisfaction increases compliance with the agreements reached.
Among elements common to disputes between individuals and between states are factors such as
lack of trust and each disputant's desire to avoid being unduly close to the other party. Trust of a
mediator may repair the lack of trust between disputants. Some disputing parties may trust one
another so little that they are unwilling to negotiate with one another. A mediator who can be
trusted to act fairly makes the disputants feel safe and therefore permits them to remain in an
otherwise dangerous setting. If one party believes that the mediator is other than neutral, that
party can move to bow out. Thomas C. Schelling's (1960) ideas on tacit bargaining, that is,
manipulating a dispute by reducing the parties' power to withdraw so that they must struggle to
the end, seem applicable to conflictual relations both between states and between individuals. A
mediator may act to confirm the strength of a commitment to remain involved until the issues
are resolved, as Cardinal Samore did in the Beagle Channel Dispute between Argentina and
Chile (Princen, 1987). A disputant may similarly commit to stay until the dispute is resolved
without saying so in so many words but by increasing the political cost to his own side of
leaving.

Mediator Resources
The power of a mediator is to a great extent a function of the resources available to the mediator
that are also valued by the disputants. Bercovitch (1986), for example, believes that leverage (an
ability to engage in "armtwisting" or to provide side payments) on the part of a mediator may
contribute more to the resolution of a conflict between states than the perceived neutrality of the
mediator. Certainly in some countries, such as Denmark, a judge serving as a mediator may
pointedly observe that if the parties cannot work out their dispute with him as a mediator, they
must face him as a judge for the same dispute. This is known as mediation leading to arbitration
or as "med/arb", an approach often seen as effective in the United States (Carnevale and Pruitt,
1992). The implicit threats of Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter to use power were scarcely
insignificant, and both of these powerful mediators used side payments to get Egyptians and
Israelis to consider entering mediation. If the disputants do not value the mediator's resources,
the mediator's ability to influence the parties becomes largely a function of the former's social
skill as listener and summarizer. The power, i.e. potential influence, of the mediator vis-a-vis
individual parties is far greater than is the power of the mediator vis-a-vis nation states or
corporations or labor unions. Sometimes individual parties may be browbeaten into agreement
while such is less likely in disputes between nation-states. In some instances, a United States'
mediator may threaten parties if they do not move toward an agreement. Such was the case with
the Vance Owen peace plan and its associated threats to Serbs. Even though mediators were not
themselves doing the threatening, threats did come from England and the United States.

Side payments are less available in interpersonal disputes. The inability of the mediator to
provide side payments in community mediation means that the mediator must rely more on the
use of interpersonal skills.

Mediator Expertise and Skills
Expertise on specific content or problems generic to specific kinds of relationships, such as child
custody, landlord-tenant or roommates, as well as expertise involving environmental disputes,
conflicts over exchanges or security may call for abilities to understand concerns that are not
readily transferred or applied from one situation to another. To mediate a dispute between
divorcing parents in a child custody case, for example, calls for different knowledge of content,
processes, and issues than does mediating between representatives of states. In the latter case,
mediators may concern themselves with boundaries, control of adjacent land, and arms control
matters. Typically, with children, as with territory, both parties compete for control, but for
different kinds of control. It is often helpful for a third party to have considerable substantive
knowledge about the issues on which a conflict centers. Such substantive knowledge can enable
a mediator to offer realistic help to the disputants as well as see possible solutions that might not
occur to the conflicting parties. Morton Deutsch (1994) has observed the importance of knowing
the rituals of politeness, of the social norms that apply in conflict situations and which vary as a
function of the cultural setting in which they occur. Understanding the steps involved in
developing mutual trust and a cooperative relationship in the sociocultural context within which
negotiations are to take place are essential to effectiveness at all levels. Moreover, "the skilled
conflict resolver will often need two types of skills. One type relates to the ability to place
oneself outside or above one's social context so that one can observe the influences emanating
from it and then consciously decide whether to resist them or not. The other type involves the
skills of a successful change agent, of someone who is able to help an institution or group to
change its culture so that it facilitates rather than hinders constructive conflict resolution."
(Deutsch, 1994, p.27) There are some situations where a mediator can transfer what she/he has
previously learned, and there are others where the mediator cannot. It would be useful for a
mediator to know which is which.
Deutsch (1994) has cited social skills involved in obtaining constructive solutions to conflict. He
notes four types of skills in particular. One set of skills is related to "the third party's establishing
an effective working relationship with each of the conflicting parties so that they will trust the
third party, communicate freely with her/hirn, and be responsive to her/his suggestions regarding
an orderly process for negotiations. " A second set is "related to establishing a cooperative
problem-solving attitude among the conflicting parties toward their conflict." Next, is the set of
skills "involved in developing a creative group problem that the conflicting parties are
confronting, [which] helps expand the range of alternatives that is perceived to be available,
facilitates realistic assessment of their feasibility as well as desirability, and facilitates the
implementation of agreed-upon solutions. " And lastly, Deutsch insists "the third party ... have
considerable substantive knowledge about the [content ofl issues around which the conflict
centers" (Deutsch, 1994, p.24).

Issues associated with a dispute may vary as a function of the kind of dispute, the number of
parties involved, and the issues that the parties see as central to a dispute. Issues may seem as
unique to divorcing parents arguing over custody and visitation rights for their children as they
do to the representatives of nation states confronting one another about the optimum location of
their mutual boundaries. The number of issues available for trading or for developing into
"packages" is ordinarily much larger in international mediation so that "log rolling" can become
more feasible. Log rolling consists of trading of an item which has only neutral value for the
initiator in return for an item he/she values more but which has only nominal value for the other.
It is a process much used by politicians. When tradeoffs can be achieved, each side can see itself
as winning. The substantive knowledge called for can enable a mediator "to see possible
solutions and to assess proposed solutions more realistically" (Deutsch, 1994, p.24).

Aspects of Mediation Process
Some aspects of mediation across levels are compared here. These include the process of
entering mediation, the degree to which sessions occur in public or private, the use of pressures
to settle, the use of caucuses, mediation time frames, acknowledgment of emotion in the
mediation process, best available alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAS), and the
norm of reciprocity.
Entering Mediation
Entry into mediation often is influenced by initiatives from the larger community, whether global
or local. Similarities rule here, and differences between international and interpersonal mediation
count for less. Institutions and bureaucracies influence what occurs in an international mediation
but often are scarcely a factor in interpersonal disputes except in states such as California and
Maine where the legislature has acted to make mediation mandatory in divorce cases involving
child custody. Community groups which perceive a need to deal with conflicts internal to them
can often persuade disputants to accept mediation. It is generally agreed that participants in the
mediation process must accept the rules suggested by the mediator; they must at least tacitly
"contract" with the mediator who will monitor the process in vivo after getting disputants to
agree to a preferred set of procedures. The ability to utilize pre-negotiation experiences can
perhaps encourage parties to consider mediation. Burton (1969), Kelman (1992), and Rothman
(1992) believe that introductory meetings or a series of workshops can increase mutual
understanding among conflicting ethnic groups, so that entry into mediation looks less dangerous
to the participants. Other forms of preparation might include lectures or videotapes on the nature
and merits of mediation, the duration of outcomes, the fairness of results, and ways one might
develop an awareness of the other party's needs (Stein, 1989).
Representatives of the parties involved must be able to explain the likely outcomes of mediation
to their followers. One virtue of having the principals rather than representatives involved is that
principals need not be as explicit about their reasons for acceptance, so that the early stages of
the mediation process can focus on the rationale for mediation as compared to its outcome,
although reconceptualization of the problem to- be mediated, as noted earlier, may help here.

As suggested earlier, at either an interpersonal or international level, mediators sometimes use
side payments to encourage parties to enter mediation. For example, BankAmerica prefers to
mediate disputes rather than to litigate them, and its preference is to split the cost of mediation.
Moreover, the company is willing to pay the fee of the mediator in disputes in which they are
involved. This acts as a kind of side payment to lure other parties into participating in the
mediation. The payment is promised whether or not the mediation is successful and whether or
not the other party withdraws before the mediation is complete (Christian, 199 1).
Privacy
During mediation, privacy protects each party from unnecessary pressure or harm from outside
parties, including various publics and other constituencies, and permits each more flexibility in
the mediating process. While secrecy can have benefits for disputants and the community during
formal grievance hearings, such benefits mean less once the problems are resolved.
Mediators and disputants widely recognize the usefulness of having their discussions private and
confidential. Research on mediation suggests that privacy and confidentiality of any negotiating
can contribute to the flexibility of the process and decrease the likelihood of negotiations
reaching an impasse (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). In both interpersonal and international mediation
there are particular virtues to maintaining privacy and confidentiality about the mediational
processes. More than that, privacy encourages participants to move beyond posturing and
positional bargaining, particularly in an international arena, and to examine options that might be
unthinkable in a public forum.
At the same time, representatives cannot move too far ahead of their constituencies; some
controlled publicity or information flowing back to constituents may be necessary. It is best to
have that information come from a single source (e. g., a mediator) so that representatives can
not readily manipulate their constituents in order to strengthen their bargaining positions. It is
different when lawyers are there as advocates bound by decisions of parties. If lawyers serve as
advocates, they merely report to the decision makers they support.
The extent of openness, once agreements have occurred, should be sufficient to ensure that
enforcement of the agreement is feasible. Privacy in a post-dispute setting makes enforcement of
the agreement more difficult. Post-mediation agreements can only be enforced to the extent that
the parties abide by the rules to which they have agreed; encouraging each other to do so sustains
their mutual commitment to these agreements. Ideally, each party is open or transparent with
respect to its good behavior or violations of trust. Monitoring becomes easier and agreements
have a longer period of survival when communities or states and their representatives can check
on the extent to which parties keep the new agreement. However, enforceability of agreements is
easier in interpersonal disputes: there one can use the courts to enforce contracts; no such
circumstance exists in the mediation of international disputes.
The interest of "outsiders" can prove to be substantial in both international and interpersonal
mediation. Such interest can create problems regarding publicity/privacy and can increase the
rigidity of positions and slow the progress of negotiation. Thus, legislatures, news media, public
opinion, and major power groups in a society may be interested "outsiders" to an international

mediation, while spouses or family members, neighbors, and co-workers may be interested
outsiders to interpersonal mediation. More information about one another may be shared in
interpersonal disputes simply because those parties tend to be closer to one another.
The Caucus
A caucus is a private meeting between the mediator and one of the parties that takes place during
the mediation. The mediator will ordinarily spend equal amounts of caucus time with each party.
The use of the caucus is often a contentious issue. Some community programs refuse to caucus,
because to do so gives the mediator too much power. While caucusing does not always occur, the
process frequently can prove useful in international and interpersonal settings as it allows the
mediator to deal separately with each party, thus reducing the likelihood of open confrontation.
Caucusing appeared invaluable for President Jimmy Carter in his Egypt-Israeli mediations at
Camp David because the two principals so readily unearthed old hurts that evoked vigorous
responses. Thus, they could not work together face-to-face. The mediator may listen separately
to issues that disputants might not wish to share with one another. More importantly, the caucus
may avoid unnecessary hostile confrontations between angry or fearful parties. The mediator
may use caucuses to reframe the bargaining situation into a positive context for each party; in
doing so, the mediator acknowledges realistic possibilities for loss and encourages both parties to
consider larger perspectives (Neale and Bazerman, 1991).
The power and significance of the caucus may influence either interpersonal or international
settings, though there may be differences, especially when tensions or emotions are high. The
caucus is a technique that permits both parties to articulate their concerns without unnecessarily
escalating the conflict in which they are involved. The use of caucuses over time and a
successive series of disputes in which the mediator moves from one location to another making
"house calls" rather than dealing with each party at the same location can prove powerful as a
way of controlling the level of tension between disputants.
Time Differences
The mediator of interpersonal disputes can accelerate the pace of mediation more readily than
can international mediators who deal with multi-layered bureaucracies in which each level has a
partial veto over steps in progress toward agreement. Interpersonal mediation is more likely to
break down after agreement is reached when parties second-guess their agreements, whereas
international mediation may break down because parties cannot reach agreement in the first
place.
Often international mediation takes far longer than interpersonal mediation, so that the impact of
external events may be greater in international situations (Princen, 1987). The Beagle Channel
dispute between Chile and Argentina -took six years to mediate, in part because of the "soft veto"
role played by "outsiders." Because the time frame for international mediation may be much
longer, the impact of external events can be much greater than is true at the level of individuals;
perseverance is a necessity for international mediators.
Acknowledgment of Emotion

In both interpersonal and international settings there is value in airing emotions and
acknowledging the personal needs of the representatives and their principals. The ability of both
parties to understand the emotional dimensions of the dispute in which they are involved can
help the parties meet their political and personal needs. However, some of the mediator's skills
readily used in interpersonal situations, such as recognizing, reflecting, and articulating the
feelings or emotions of disputants, might not be adaptable to international negotiating. In
international settings, overtly recognizing emotions threatens the status of the parties involved.
At the same time, not at least being aware of emotional aspects may lead emotion to play an
important "underground" role that influences the parties more because its presence is not
acknowledged.
Best Available Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAS)
Disputants always face choices in the decisions they make. At minimum they can choose
between an agreement or no agreement. They may regard a negotiated agreement as unappealing
in contrast to other possibilities. A labor union may regard a strike as better than an acceptance
of an unappealing offer from representatives of management. One country may be willing to go
to war rather than accept the demands of another; such was the case with Saddam Hussein prior
to the start of the Gulf War (Fisher and Ury, 1981). There may be authoritative solutions
available in interpersonal conflicts in terms of the law and courts but not in international arenas.
The existence of authoritative decisions affect incentives to settle by affecting the range of
options available from which each side chooses.
Reciprocity
Particularly but not exclusively in disputes between individuals, factors such as the norm of
reciprocity may be significant. Reciprocity implies a sequential balance in the gains and
concessions of each party. That norm may also prove significant in relations between states when
threats to status may have particular salience. In the mediation between Israel and Egypt, Egypt
and Israel owed a favor to the United States, both for providing the service of mediation itself
and for the positive inducements provided by the side payments. In that situation the side
payments also served to recognize the status of the disputants, not just for the moment but also
for the future. The anticipation of reciprocity necessarily means that expectations for the future
may be important, whether those expectations be hopes or fears. At the interpersonal level side
payments are far smaller and serve fewer functions but still may be used, such as when the
mediator recognizes nonverbally as well as verbally the status of each of the parties.
Relationships build upon reciprocal relations between actions and reactions that can serve as
tangible bases for settlements and so contribute to conflict resolution. What matters most is what
parties do to and for one another, which are steps beyond talk and perceptions. For conflict
resolution, mutual apologies and forgiveness are called for that make possible mutual refraining
between individuals and collective groups.

Enforcement and Compliance

Agreements reached in mediation are not always regarded as enforceable. As mentioned earlier,
openness and publicity help; such agreements are more readily enforceable when the larger
community knows of their existence. Publicity might delay and hinder the mediation process, but
eventually it contributes to mutual and community monitoring and, perhaps, to enforcement of
mediation outcomes. Privacy or secrecy increases possibilities for flexibility during the
negotiation process. Once mediation has been concluded, the situation changes, and transparency
with respect to actions and likely motives yields more payoff. Undue privacy at that point makes
enforcement more difficult. On the other hand, mediation can occur in very sensitive areas such
as cases of sexual harassment. The successful mediation of a case of sexual harassment might
lead both sides to avoid going public about the agreement reached in order to protect all
involved.
The process of resolving international conflicts tends to lead to open and public agreements to a
greater extent than is the case with interpersonal ones. Expectations of extended relationships can
themselves, as suggested above, lead to attempts to resolve disputes. These expectations
encourage parties to avoid conflicts and to have procedures already in place to avoid or to
resolve future conflicts. The openness that develops allows for easier monitoring. This openness
is similar to verification procedures in arms control agreements, in that it encourages abiding by
such treaties, in part because known violations could lead violators to lose many other
advantages of a treaty.
Side payments can also be used to encourage settlement or compliance. Internationally,
Kissinger and Carter both promised Egypt and Israel substantial annual benefits ($4 billion to
Israel and $3 billion to Egypt) for continuing a peaceful relationship.

Normative Distinctions
When mediators dealing with interpersonal disputes fail to view collectively, they can also fail to
perceive the relevant larger constituencies and inadvertently create a barrier that is difficult to
surmount. Mediators of interpersonal disputes can, and should, attend more to the larger aspects
of local collectivities that range from friends and relatives to community and the state in which
disputes are centered and which might provide a supportive and normative context. Such might
be the case were one of these collectivities to provide some form of side payments.
The fact that international mediators are not always likely to listen to arguments or insights that
emerge at a community level should not discourage community level mediators from learning
from international-level mediators. By doing so they can become more aware and make use of
the constituencies of interested outsiders existing at both levels, to understand and to deal more
effectively with the principals in a dispute. Being aware of constituencies can satisfy the basis
needed to transform relationships, especially in constituencies less individualistic than are
American cultures (Merry, 1982,1989). International communities can be rebuilt when outside
parties donate resources, such as they do for peacekeeping operations. A similar use of resources
at the interpersonal level might be considered to provide "jump starts" toward rebuilding future
relationships. Relationships build upon reciprocal relations between actions and reactions that
can serve as tangible bases for settlements and so contribute to conflict resolution. What matters

most is what parties do to and for one another, which steps are taken beyond talk and
perceptions. For conflict resolution, mutual apologies and forgiveness are called for that make
possible mutual refraining among individuals and collective groups.
An analogous barrier and a kind of incompleteness exists when international mediators fail to see
and to deal with interpersonal aspects of relationships. They should include what they often miss,
for otherwise they focus exclusively on positional bargaining and parts related to the
bureaucracies within which they are embedded.

Conclusion
There are similarities across levels of mediated disputes. Disputants resolve disputes; they are
not like arbitrated or adjudicated resolutions. Mediators are present and seek agreement between
the parties as to the nature of the process of the mediation. A mediator with status and a
reputation for status may more readily encourage parties to enter mediation. The mediator
monitors the mediation process as it moves from one stage to the next, from the concerns to the
issues, for example. The use of caucuses is not infrequent across settings. It is probably the case
that the mediator must be able to grasp and describe the central issues of the dispute to the
disputing parties. Asymmetries of power between parties are not unusual at any level. Neither is
a lack of trust between parties that leads to desires to avoid being close to one another. Mediators
fairly often may seek to limit the parties' abilities to withdraw before some agreement is reached.
There are some factors generic to mediation, such as the need for the mediator to describe the
process of mediation, and then learn how each party perceives the other, the other's motives, and
the nature of the dispute. The mediator may reflect to each party the perceptions of the different
disputants to themselves and one another, each party serving as an audience for the other. The
mediator hypothesizes or formulates what appear to be central issues about which some
negotiation is feasible (Zartman and Berman, 1982). Once there is agreement as to what the
major issues are, the mediator listens to disputants and encourages them as they begin, typically
one at a time, to formulate possible resolutions. The mediator may attempt to reframe the issues
in a dispute; the very nature of the issues will vary by sector and level. A mediator may
encourage the parties to move toward creative resolution of disputes by pointing out ways used
by others to resolve their disputes. The mediator may encourage movement toward resolution
and the formulation of a mutually satisfying agreement or contract.
There are other major similarities: privacy or secrecy during the mediational process is important
at each level, and, similarly, openness once agreements have been reached supports agreements
at both levels and supplies bases for verification. Caucuses that separate parties are useful in both
settings, particularly when negative emotions run high. To the extent that disputing parties value
the resources available to a mediator, the mediator's power to influence the process of the
mediation increases.
There are also marked differences across levels. Various levels of dispute from interpersonal to
international as well as disputes of different kinds, such as ones about the environment or union
recognition, may typically imply different issues. Disputes among different parties from diverse

cultures can have very different implications. Divorce custody cases may lead mediators to think
differently, because they must draw upon different knowledge bases to determine what is
relevant.
Side payments as an inducement to enter mediation or as an incentive to ensure compliance with
whatever agreements are reached are far more likely to occur at the international level. Outside
collectivities are rather more likely to encourage entry into mediation between major actors such
as nation-states, although at community levels such entry may be at least briefly mandated.
Mediators may more often bring their own agendas to the mediation of disputes between states.
As a result, mediators are less frequently neutral in international settings. More mediator status is
called for when, as is the case between nationstates, both disputing parties are themselves
powerful.
There are other differences: international mediation tends to be far more complex and takes
longer than interpersonal mediation. Knowledge relevant to understanding the content and issues
of a dispute weighs more heavily in more complex disputes, such as ones between nations.
Mediators and the practice of mediation face obstacles at each level. Each level has strengths that
could be used by practitioners on other levels to overcome obstacles. Side payments are used at
the international level and could possibly be used more frequently at the interpersonal level to
provide incentives toward resolutions. Similarly the interpersonal level might employ more
frequent use of caucuses and develop more awareness of the community context in which the
mediation takes place. Attention to individual personality differences of key players might aid
movement at the international level.
Mediators may improve their skills at one level by increasing their understanding of factors at a
different level of conflict so they can be more aware of distinctive aspects of what they do. Being
knowledgeable or skillful at international mediation may provide useful insights about
interpersonal mediation. Researchers and practitioners of mediation at all levels are challenged to
identify and share such insights with each other.
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